Why does the productivity of investment vary across countries? by Nell, Kevin S. & Thirlwall, A.P.
1 
 
  Why Does the Productivity of Investment Vary Across Countries? 
    Kevin S. Nell and A.P. Thirlwall1 
Introduction 
 In his famous paper ‘An Essay in Dynamic Theory’, Harrod (1939) expressed a country’s 
actual growth rate as the ratio of how much it saves as a proportion of national income (s) and its 
actual incremental capital-output ratio (c) which includes changes in the level of inventories. i.e. 
 g  =  s/c         (1) 
where s = S/Y and c = ΔK/ΔY = I/ΔY. Since savings equals investment in the national accounts, 
equation (1) is true by definition. Equally, a country’s growth rate may be expressed as the product 
of how much it invests as a proportion of national income and the productivity of investment. i.e. 
 g  =  .   =   .        (2) 
where I/Y is the investment ratio and ΔY/I is the productivity of investment  (and the reciprocal of 
the capital-output ratio in equation (1) when S=I). If the productivity of investment was the same 
across countries, there would be a perfect correlation between the growth of countries and the 
proportion of national income invested. To the extent that there is not a perfect correlation, this 
must be the result of differences in the productivity of investment. 
 The purpose of this article is threefold: firstly to show that there are large differences in the 
productivity of investment across countries; secondly to test econometrically the possible causes of 
differences in the productivity of investment using explanatory variables commonly used in the 
growth literature, and thirdly to test the orthodox neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to 
capital which, if true, would mean that investment does not matter for long run growth. We can say 
in advance that the assumption of diminishing returns to capital is not supported by the evidence.  
The productivity of investment is as high, if not higher, in rich countries as in poor countries. We take 
for analysis a sample of 84 developed and developing countries over the period 1980-2011. This is 
the largest sample of countries for which reliable data are available for a period exceeding thirty 
years. Nineteen potential determinants of productivity differences are considered using the general-
to-specific model selection algorithm of Autometrics (Krolzig and Hendry, 2001; Doornik and Hendry, 
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2013). This is an important, but under-explored, topic with policy implications for countries which 
wish to improve their growth performance on a sustainable basis. Before considering the empirics, 
however, let us consider what orthodox growth theory has to say about the role of investment in 
growth and the productivity of investment. 
Orthodox Growth Theory: Old and ‘New’ 
 Orthodox growth theory is still based on the neoclassical theory of growth as first developed 
by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). Neoclassical growth theory still dominates the economics 
textbooks and the teaching of economic growth across the world. How the model achieved the 
elevated status it has is still something of a mystery because most of its assumptions and predictions 
are manifestly false. There are three basic assumptions of the model, and three basic predictions. 
The first assumption is that the labour force and labour-augmenting technical progress (or labour 
productivity growth) grow at a constant exogenous rate, and these two variables determine the long 
run growth of countries. This is a supply-oriented model in which the level or pressure of demand for 
output plays no part. In practice, however, we know that the labour force responds to the pressure 
of demand through variations in employment or participation rates of the labour force, hours 
worked and migration; and we know that technical progress is endogenous because investment 
responds to the pressure of demand which embodies technical change. New vintages of capital are 
more productive than older vintages. Harrod (1939) described the sum of labour force growth and 
technical progress (or labour productivity growth) as the natural rate of growth (gn). But there is 
nothing natural about the natural rate of growth (León-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2000). There is now 
ample research showing that the natural rate of growth is endogenous, not exogenous, responding 
to the actual growth rate (León-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2000, 2002; Vogel, 2009; Libanio, 2009; Dray 
and Thirlwall, 2011). 
 The second basic assumption of the neoclassical growth model is that all saving is invested. 
There is no independent investment function. This assumption implies no long run deficiency of 
aggregate demand, ruling out long periods of secular stagnation with growth lower than its 
potential. It is a return to pre-Keynesian economics which assumes that the rate of interest is the 
price which equilibrates the supply and demand for saving. Keynes showed this to be false; it is 
changes in income that equilibrates savings and investment via the multiplier, and the rate of 
interest is the price which equilibrates the supply and demand for money. 
 The third assumption of the neoclassical growth model is that the function relating output  
to inputs is the so-called Cobb-Douglas production function in which the elasticities of output with 
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respect to labour and capital are both less than unity; and the sum of the elasticities equals unity 
which implies constant returns to scale. Labour input, capital input and total factor productivity 
growth are all exogenously determined. The crucial assumption for the predictions of the model is 
that the elasticity of output with respect to capital is less than unity so that the productivity of 
investment is assumed to fall as the capital-labour ratio rises i.e. diminishing returns to capital. 
 These assumptions lead to three basic predictions of the model. First, in the steady state of 
the model the level of per capita income will be positively related to the savings ratio of countries 
and negatively related to the growth of population. This prediction is generally supported (see 
Mankiw et al., 1992). Secondly, in the long run steady state, the growth of output per head (or living 
standards) is independent of the ratio of investment to national income because of the assumption 
of diminishing returns to capital. In the limit the productivity of investment falls to zero. In the 
transition from one steady state to another, investment can raise the growth rate temporarily, but 
not the long run growth performance. This is determined by the growth of the labour force and 
labour productivity. The model begs the question, of course, of how long is the long run? Early 
theoretical simulation models (e.g. Atkinson, 1969; Sato, 1966) suggested a transition of anything 
between 50 and 80 years which brings to mind the quip of Keynes (1936) that in the long run we are 
all dead. It is in the present that we have our being, and current investment will matter for growth 
performance. How important investment is for growth is an empirical question that we examine 
later. 
 The third prediction of the neoclassical growth model is that because of diminishing returns 
to capital, poor countries should grow faster than rich countries, given the same tastes and 
preferences for saving and investment, and therefore there should be a convergence of per capita 
incomes across the world. Historically (see Milanovic, 2016; Bourgninon, 2015) we don’t observe the 
convergence of living standards across countries as measured by the international Gini ratio which 
takes the average level of per capita income of each country to make the calculation. In 1820, the 
international Gini ratio was approximately 0.2; today it is 0.5, and reached a peak of 0.54 in 2000. 
Why is this? Is it because savings and investment rates differ significantly between rich and poor 
countries (in which case the  unconditional convergence of per capita incomes  is not to be 
expected), or is the assumption of diminishing returns to capital false so that the productivity of 
investment is not higher in poor countries than in rich countries? This is a matter that we explore 
later. 
 The lack of convergence of per capita incomes across the world gave rise in the 1980s to 
what has become to be known as ‘new growth theory’ or endogenous growth theory. ‘New’ models 
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of economic growth, but building on orthodox supply-oriented theory, were pioneered by Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) which attempted to explain why the productivity of investment does not 
necessarily fall as countries get richer and accumulate more capital per head. Romer argued that 
there are externalities to research and development (R&D) which keep the productivity of 
investment from falling, while Lucas stressed the role of education and human capital formation. In 
fact, it is clear from the definition of the capital-output ratio that anything that raises output per 
head in the same proportion as capital per head will keep the capital-output ratio (or the 
productivity of investment) constant. The capital-output ratio may be written as: 
   =  .         (3) 
where K/Y is the capital-output ratio; K/L is the capital-labour ratio, and L/Y is the labour input per 
unit of output (which is the reciprocal of labour productivity). It can be seen that anything that 
reduces labour input per unit of output in the same proportion as K/L increases will keep K/Y 
constant, including, for example, learning by doing, in addition to R&D and improvements in the 
quality of the labour force. 
 The simplest version of new growth theory is the so-called AK model which assumes 
constant returns to capital i.e. 
 Y = AK         (4) 
where Y is output, K is capital (broadly defined) and A is a constant. On simple inspection it is 
obvious that this specification is the static analogue of the Harrod growth equation. Totally 
differentiating equation (4), and dividing by Y gives: 
   =  g = A  = A  =        (5) 
where I/Y = s is the savings (investment) ratio and c = 1/A is  the actual incremental capital-output 
ratio. 
 As a matter of historical interest, the ‘new’ growth theorists were not the first to explain 
why the productivity of investment may not decline as countries get richer and accumulate more 
capital per head. Nicholas Kaldor, the famous Hungarian/Cambridge economist (and  bete noire of 
the neoclassical school) pointed out, many years prior, the rough constancy of the capital-output 
ratio as one of his so-called ‘stylised facts’ of economic growth that he sought to explain in models of 
economic growth developed in the late 1950s/early 1960s (Kaldor 1957,1961). We can quote Kaldor 
in full: 
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As regards the process of economic change and development in capitalist societies, I 
suggest the following ‘stylised facts’ as a starting point for the construction of 
theoretical models - - - - -(4) steady capital-output ratios over long periods; at least 
there are no clear long-term trends, either rising or falling, if differences in the degree 
of capital utilisation are allowed for. This implies , or reflects, the near identity in the 
percentage rate of growth of production and the capital stock i.e. that for the economy 
as a whole, and over long periods, incomes and capital tend to grow at the same rate 
(Kaldor, 1961, p.178). 
 
Kaldor’s explanation lay in his innovation of the technical progress function (TPF), to replace the 
neoclassical production function with its artificial distinction between movements along the function 
and shifts in the function, relating the growth of output per worker (q) to the rate of growth of 
capital per worker (k), the slope and position of which determines the long-run equilibrium growth 
of output. Consider Figure 1 below: 
     Figure 1 
           Kaldor’s Technical Progress Function 
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autonomous technical progress (e.g. learning by doing) independent of capital accumulation, while  
the slope of the TPF measures the technical dynamism of a country. A flat slope indicates 
sluggishness, with capital accumulation leading to a slow rate of productivity growth, while a steep 
slope indicates a dynamic economy with capital accumulation embodying a significant degree of 
technical progress. Anywhere along the 45-degree line, the capital-output ratio is constant. At q*-k*, 
the economy is in equilibrium. Now suppose there is an upward shift of the TPF to TPF1 , which raises 
output growth by more than capital accumulation, increasing the productivity of investment  and 
raising the rate of profit. This induces an increase in the rate of capital accumulation to k1* and 
restores the capital-output ratio at X1, giving an equilibrium growth of output per man of q1*. By 
contrast, if investment gets ahead of technical progress (e.g. a rise in k without an upward shift in 
TPF) the productivity of investment falls, the rate of profit falls, and investment is cut back. In other 
words, either way, capital accumulation adjusts to changes in technical dynamism preserving the 
rate of profit and the capital-output ratio. New endogenous growth theory is precisely anticipated. 
 What applies to countries through time applies pari passu to different countries at a point in 
time, with differences in growth rates at the same capital-output ratio being associated with 
different technical progress functions (q1* > q*). To quote Kaldor again (Kaldor, 1972, p.11-12): 
A lower capital-labour ratio does not necessarily imply a lower capital-output ratio – 
indeed, the reverse is often the case. The countries with the most highly mechanised 
industries, such as the United States, do not require a higher ratio of capital to output. 
The capital-output ratio in the United States has been falling over the last 50 years, 
while the capital-labour ratio has been steadily rising; and it is lower in the United 
States today than in the manufacturing industries of several developing countries. 
Technological progress in the present century led to a vast increase in the productivity 
of labour, but this was not accompanied by any associated reduction in the 
productivity of capital investment. 
 
We shall give some evidence below which supports Kaldor’s assertion that the productivity of 
investment is as high in rich countries as it is in poor countries. 
Investment and Growth, and ‘New’ Growth Theory 
 Now let us look at the evidence on the relationship between investment and economic 
growth. We take 84 rich and poor countries for which reliable data are available over the years 1980 
to 2011, and plot the scatter diagram in Figure 2. 
Average GDP growth is measured on the vertical axis and the average ratio of investment to GDP is 
measured on the horizontal axis. The scatter points show a rough positive relationship which is 
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confirmed by the estimation of a simple cross-section regression equation which gives (t values in 
parentheses):  
  g = 0.20 + 0.16 (I/Y)      (6) 
          (0.28)       (4.79)    
 
Figure 2 
Investment and Growth 
 
Notes: 1) Data source: World Bank Development Indicators. 2) Figure 2 is scaled according to the lowest 
investment ratio in the sample, which is 10.7%.  
  
The regression coefficient of 0.16 is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, and 
implies an average productivity of investment across the sample of 16 percent. The coefficient of 
determination (R-squared), however, is only 0.22 which leaves a lot of the variance in the growth of 
output to be explained by differences in the productivity of investment. Taking account of 
population growth (p), and regressing the rate of growth of per capita income on the investment 
ratio, gives: 
  g-p = -2.64 + 0.21 (I/Y)      (7) 
                 (-4.73)       (7.94)  
 
Now the R-squared is 0.43 which leaves just over one-half of the variance in per capita income 
growth to be explained by differences in the productivity of investment. 
 The test of new growth theory is to see whether there is convergence or divergence of per 
capita incomes across countries, and to run a simple regression (see Barro, 1991): 
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  g-p = a + b(lnitial PCY)      (8) 
where g-p is the average growth of per capita income (PCY) over a period and lnitial PCY is the log of 
the initial level of per capita income of countries. If b is significantly negative this is taken as 
signifying unconditional convergence (often referred to as beta convergence) explained by 
diminishing returns to capital. If b is not significantly different from zero (or positive), the hypothesis 
of unconditional convergence is rejected, and then researchers add other explanatory variables to 
test for conditional convergence to see whether the sign on the initial PCY turns negative when 
other factors are allowed for. Barro (1991) was one of the first to control for differences in education 
across a sample of 98 countries over the period 1960 to 1985, and found evidence for conditional 
convergence. The partial correlation between the rate of growth of per capita income and the initial 
level of PCY is -0.7 when differences in education are allowed for. Barro concludes: ‘thus in a 
modified sense, the data support the convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth models [based 
on diminishing returns to capital]. A poor country tends to grow faster than a rich country, but only 
for a given quantity of human capital’ (p.409). Barro, and other ‘new’ growth theorists, are really 
neoclassical economists in disguise. Their models are still supply-oriented in which demand plays no 
part. The only difference from ‘old’ growth theory is that each country reaches its own steady-state 
level of per capita income and not a common level as in the original Solow model. 
 Other new growth theorists add other variables to the basic equation (8) such as population 
growth; trade variables; government consumption expenditure; institutional and political variables, 
and investment. But it is clear from equation (2) that if the investment ratio is added as an 
explanatory variable, all the other variables must be picking up the productivity of investment. As 
Levine and Renelt (1992) perceptively remark: ‘If we include INV [the share of investment in GDP in 
the equation] the only channel through which other explanatory variables can explain growth 
differentials is [through] the efficiency of resource allocation’; in other words, by differences in the 
productivity of investment. 
 Let us consider in more detail an augmented ‘new’ growth theory estimating equation of the 
form: 
 g-p = a + b(lnitialPCY) + b1(I/Y) + bn(Zn)     (9) 
where Zn is a vector of other explanatory variables (where n is the number of other variables). What 
we are arguing is that if I/Y is in the equation, and we know by definition that g = (I/Y)(ΔY/I), the 
other explanatory variables must be picking up the effect on ΔY/I – the productivity of investment. 
But in new growth theory the productivity of investment is never treated as a dependent variable. 
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Moreover, and most important, a significant negative b coefficient in equation (9) cannot be taken 
as conclusive evidence of diminishing returns to capital because a negative sign is consistent first of 
all with faster structural change from low to higher productivity sectors in poor countries, and 
secondly with ‘catch-up’. As Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) remark in their paper on human capital in 
development: ‘a negative coefficient estimate on initial income levels may not be a sign of 
convergence due to diminishing returns, but of catch-up from adoption of technology from abroad. 
These two forces may be observationally equivalent in simple cross-country growth accounting 
exercises’ (p.160). 
Measuring the Productivity of Investment 
 These weaknesses in the new growth theory empirical literature, and the interpretation of 
results, may be overcome by converting a ‘new’ growth estimating equation into a productivity of 
investment equation by dividing both sides of equation (9) by I/Y which gives: 
  = b1 + a(I/Y)-1  + b( ) + bn( )     (10) 
There are many other ways of measuring the productivity of investment, but this is by far the 
simplest and the most consistent way for analysis across countries2. The variable on the left hand 
side of equation (10) is what we call the adjusted or net productivity of investment (adjusting for the 
contribution that population growth makes to output growth through the growth of the workforce).3 
The relationship between the net productivity of investment (nPOI)) and the inverse of the 
investment ratio (I/Y)-1 provides a direct measure of the returns to capital. A positive sign indicates 
diminishing returns, and if ‘a’ is not significantly different from zero this would indicate constant 
returns to capital i.e. no relation between the quantity of investment relative to GDP and its 
productivity.4 The sign on the initial per capita income variable in equation (10) measures whether or 
not there is conditional convergence, but a negative sign can no longer be interpreted, as Barro 
(1991) does, as a rehabilitation of the neoclassical model with diminishing returns to capital because 
this has already been controlled for. 
 
                                                          
2 See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for a survey. 
3  This is similar to Leibenstein’s (1966) concept of the population-adjusted incremental capital-output ratio (or 
its reciprocal) 
4 In Nell and Thirlwall (2017), we show more formally that the diminishing returns to capital hypothesis derived 
from the empirical model in equation (10) is consistent with Solow’s (1956) neoclassical model, while the 
constant returns hypothesis is compatible with the theoretical framework of AK-style endogenous growth 
models. 
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Descriptive Analysis 
 To test for diminishing returns to capital, and the determinants of the productivity of 
investment, we shall be basically running regressions of type equations (9) and (10), using the 
software Autometrics (Doornik and Hendry, 2013). We have assembled a consistent data set for 84 
developed and developing countries which includes nineteen explanatory variables over the period 
1980-2011. The precise definition of the variables, and the countries taken, are given in Appendix 1 
and 2. Before econometric estimation, however, it is informative to look at the raw data on gross 
investment productivity and net (adjusted for population growth) investment productivity across the 
World Bank’s income classification of countries in 2013: low income (LI); lower middle income (LMI); 
upper middle income (UMI), and high income (HI), and also across quartiles of countries from 
poorest to richest based on their initial level of per capita income in 1980. The results are given in 
Tables 1 and 2, together with the standard deviation of all the variables in parentheses. 
 The first data column in both Tables gives the average unadjusted or gross  productivity of 
investment (POI); column 2 gives the average growth of per capita income (g-p); column 3 gives the 
average population-adjusted or net POI, and column 4 gives the average investment ratio (I/Y).  
Table 1: 
  World Bank Income Classification (2013) and Capital Productivity 
Income Classification 
(number of countries) 
Gross POI 
(%) 
(g – p) 
(%) 
Net POI 
(%) 
I/Y 
(%) 
LI 
(13 countries) 
21.35 
(7.92) 
0.86 
(1.44) 
4.10 
(9.58) 
16.93 
(3.46) 
LMI 
(23 countries) 
18.52 
(6.32) 
1.35 
(1.49) 
6.47 
(7.50) 
19.94 
(4.23) 
UMI 
(17 countries) 
18.32 
(4.14) 
2.17 
(1.26) 
9.45 
(4.45) 
22.13 
(3.93) 
HI 
(31 countries) 
13.10 
(4.90) 
2.07 
(0.97) 
8.91 
(3.40) 
22.16 
(3.58) 
                      
                     Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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   Table 2: 
Income Quartiles: Initial Per Capita Income Levels 1980 
Income Classification 
(number of countries) 
Gross POI 
(%) 
(g – p) 
(%) 
Net POI 
(%) 
I/Y 
(%) 
Poorest quartile 
(21 countries) 
22.05 
(7.00) 
1.38 
(1.64) 
6.54 
(9.05) 
18.03 
(3.99) 
Second poorest quartile 
(21 countries) 
17.33 
(5.32) 
1.55 
(1.60) 
6.40 
(7.44) 
21.52 
(4.72) 
Second richest quartile 
(21 countries) 
17.52 
(4.17) 
2.26 
(1.23) 
10.00 
(4.14) 
21.82 
(4.36) 
Richest quartile 
(21 countries) 
10.75 
(2.94) 
1.64 
(0.43) 
7.76 
(2.20) 
21.34 
(2.36) 
 
             Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the low income countries have a higher gross productivity of investment than 
high income countries, but this conclusion is reversed when population growth is allowed for. In the 
low income countries the adjusted productivity of investment is as low as 4 percent, whereas it is 
nearly 9 percent in the high income countries. But note that the standard deviations in the low- and 
middle-income countries are much larger than in the upper middle-income and high-income 
countries. Table 2 tells a similar story, except now the net productivity of investment is more equal 
across low and high income countries. The richest quartile of countries has a productivity of 7.7 
percent, and the poorest quartile has a productivity of 6.5 percent, but again the standard deviation 
in the poorest two quartiles are large relative to the richest two quartiles. Overall, this means that 
there is a large cross-section variation within the poorest countries and also across all countries. 
 If we further divide our sample of 84 countries into equal halves according to 1980 per 
capita income levels, and compare the productivity of investment in the poorest and richest 
countries, we get a net productivity of investment of 8.9 percent for rich countries and 6.5 percent 
for poor countries, with standard deviations of 3.5 percent and 8.2 percent in each half, respectively. 
 Overall, therefore, what the raw evidence shows is that while, on average, the net  
productivity of investment seems to be roughly equal across groups of countries, there is wide 
variation within groups of countries, and this is what we will try and explain with our econometric 
modelling. We can say in advance that there are a number of factors which are significant in 
explaining this wide variation in the net productivity of investment across rich and poor countries, 
but the econometric results reject the neoclassical hypothesis of diminishing returns to capital. 
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Determinants of the Productivity of Investment 
 Many factors determine a country’s productivity of investment. We consider nineteen 
potential explanatory variables which we think might be important, and which have been used in the 
new growth theory literature as independent variables. A full list of regressors and their definition is 
given in Appendix 1. The education and skill of the workforce is likely to play an important role, so 
we include the average years of schooling at primary, secondary and tertiary level, and also interact 
education with the initial level of per capita income to test whether education helps a country to 
catch up at a faster rate. Institutional structures are likely to be important, and we measure the 
institutional framework by an index of political rights, and by the number of revolutions and coups 
within a country5. Trade can affect the productivity of investment in a number of ways. To compete 
in world markets the export sector needs to be competitive and dynamic. The growth of exports will 
affect the capacity utilisation of capital because a shortage of foreign exchange can push an 
economy into recession. We include as regressors a trade openness variable and the growth of 
exports. The structure of an economy will matter which we measure by the share of mining and 
quarrying in GDP. Latitude and geography are likely to be important because the productivity of 
agriculture is partly dependent on climatic and soil conditions which vary with distance from the 
equator. The degree of financial deepening of an economy will affect the productivity of investment 
through its role in allocating resources to the most productive sectors of an economy. Financial 
deepening is the case for financial liberalisation (Shaw, 1973). We measure financial deepening by 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (Levine, 1997). It is often claimed that government consumption 
distorts the allocation of resources and reduces the productivity of investment, so we include the 
ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP as a potential regressor. Inflation can also 
distort the allocation of resources by diverting savings and investment into non-productive assets 
such as land, property and precious metals. The variability of inflation also affects the stability of an 
economy which, in turn, affects the utilisation of capital, so the rate of inflation and its standard 
deviation are included as independent variables. Finally, we control for population growth, and 
include the population size of countries to capture scale effects associated with market size.  The 
initial level of per capita income is an additional regressor to test the convergence hypothesis.6 
 
 
                                                          
5 We also used a rule of law index (Barro, 1998) for a smaller sample of 79 countries, but it was eliminated in 
the model reduction process. The significance of all other variables remained virtually unchanged. 
6 Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain information on R&D expenditure for our full sample of countries. 
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Econometric Methodology 
 Given the long list of potential regressors, a major empirical issue is to decide on the 
appropriate methodology to estimate the impact of the various variables. We employ Hendry’s 
(1995) general-to-specific (Gets) model selection procedure, as embodied in the computer-
automated Autometrics progamme of Doornik and Hendry (2013).7 Owen (2003) neatly describes 
the Gets methodology as ‘the formulation of a “general” unrestricted model that is congruent with 
the data and the application of a “testing” down process, eliminating variables with coefficients that 
are not statistically significant, leading to a simpler “specific” congruent model that encompasses 
rival models’ (p.609).  
 To iron out business cycle fluctuations in the per capita growth rate and investment ratio 
series, we use long-run cross section averages over the period 1980 to 2011. The use of long-run 
data also minimises potential endogeneity problems that may arise from short-run business cycle 
correlations between the two series. The same argument applies to other flow variables in the data 
set. All stock variables are measured as close as possible to the beginning of the period (1980) so 
that it is possible to estimate the impact on the net productivity of investment after the initial shock 
to an independent variable (which should take care of simultaneity problems). The Autometrics 
modelling procedure will select a well-specified, statistically robust and theory-consistent empirical 
model. 
 The econometric specification of the net productivity of investment (nPOI) model in 
equation (10) is: 
(nPOI)i = b1 + a(I/Y)i-1 +  b( )i + bn( )i  +( )i          i = 1 - - - - 84  (11) 
where Zn is the vector of potential determinants of the productivity of investment discussed earlier , 
and (ε)/(I/Y) is the unobserved error term. The impact of investment is measured by the asymptote 
or constant (b1) and the inverse of the investment ratio (I/Y)i-1 measures the returns to investment. 
 Table 3 reports the specific model chosen by Autometrics for the sample of 84 countries. 8 
The outlier detection test of Autometrics, based on the significance levels of the largest residuals, 
identifies two country dummies – Cote D’Ivoire and Rwanda. The regression model is well 
                                                          
7 The advantages of the Gets methodology relative to other approaches, such as extreme bounds (see Leamer, 
1983, 1985) and Bayesian Model Averaging (see Fernández et al. 2001), are discussed in Hendry and Krolzig 
(2004) and Hoover and Perez (2004). 
8 For details on the settings we use in Autometrics to obtain the specific model, see Appendix B in Nell and 
Thirlwall (2017). 
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determined with a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.72, and ten explanatory variables are 
identified as significant at the one percent and five percent significance level. There is some 
evidence of heteroscedasticity, but the model remains well determined when heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors (HCSE) are used in column (ii). The diagnostic tests further show that the 
model is well-specified and that the residuals are normally distributed.9 The explanatory variables in 
order of significance are: the standard deviation of inflation [INFLSDEV]; the growth of exports 
[GEX]; latitude [ABLAT]; government consumption [GCON]; political rights [PRIGHTS]; total years of 
education in 1980 [TOTED80]; total years of education interacted with the initial level of per capita 
income in 1980 [TOTED80xlnRDGP80]; trade openness [TOPEN], and the log of the initial level of per 
capita income [lnRGDP80]. The negative sign on the initial per capita income variable means that 
there is evidence of convergence of the net productivity of investment; this must be due to faster 
structural change in poor countries or catch-up. The asymptote implies an average productivity of 
investment across the 84 countries of 13 percent (compared with the estimate in equation (11a) in 
footnote 6 below of 14.5 percent). The coefficient on the inverse of the investment ratio (a) does not 
differ significantly from zero which means there is no evidence of diminishing returns to capital; in 
other words, no evidence that the productivity of investment declines as countries get richer. The 
Gets modelling procedure rejects the role of financial variables; population growth and size; the 
number of revolutions and coups, and the share of mining in GDP, in determining the productivity of 
investment.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 In our more technical paper (Nell and Thirlwall, 2017), to overcome the presence of heteroscedasticity, we 
estimate equation (11) without dividing through by (I/Y) i.e. we estimate the equation: 
(g-p)i = a + b1(I/Y)i + b(lnitialPCY)i + bn(Zn)i + εi  (11a). Since (11) and (11a) are mathematically equivalent we can 
derive the coefficients in equation (11) from the estimates of (11a). When this is done, there is very little 
difference in the estimates. The coefficient on the investment ratio is 0.145 and the intercept is not 
significantly different from zero. 
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Table 3: 
Regression Results of the Investment Productivity Equation (11)a 
Independent variable 
(i) 
Specific Model 
 
(ii) 
Specific Model 
(HCSE)a 
  1/ YI  0 0 
Asymptote (b1) 
0.1306*** 
(5.26) 
0.1306*** 
(4.87) 
lnRGDP80/(I/Y) 
–0.1539** 
(2.07) 
–0.1539** 
(2.45) 
TOTED80/(I/Y) 
0.8155*** 
(2.70) 
0.8155** 
(2.32) 
(TOTED80  lnRGDP80)/(I/Y) 
–0.0834*** 
(2.68) 
–0.0834** 
(2.39) 
ABLAT/(I/Y) 
0.0287*** 
(3.60) 
0.0287*** 
(3.94) 
GCON/(I/Y) 
–0.0682*** 
(3.35) 
–0.0682*** 
(2.80) 
GEX/(I/Y) 
0.1191*** 
(4.06) 
0.1191** 
(2.40) 
INFLSDEV/(I/Y) 
–0.0004*** 
(4.75) 
–0.0004*** 
(7.11) 
PRIGHTS/(I/Y) 
–0.1927*** 
(3.07) 
–0.1927*** 
(2.72) 
TOPEN/(I/Y) 
0.0051*** 
(2.67) 
0.0051*** 
(3.76) 
Country dummy (Côte d’Ivoire)b 
0.1108*** 
(2.91) 
0.1108*** 
(7.94) 
Country dummy (Rwanda)b 
–0.1370*** 
(3.38) 
–0.1370*** 
(7.96) 
Diagnostic Testsc 
R2 0.72 
Standard error ( ˆ ) 0.035 
Reset (misspecification): F-test {0.35} 
Normality test: 2 [2] {0.85} 
Heteroscedasticity(S): F-test       {0.01}*** 
Heteroscedasticity(X): F-test       {0.00}*** 
Chow (43): F-test {0.93} 
Chow (77): F-test {0.70} 
Number of observations (N) 84 countries 
Notes: 
a.The figures in parentheses () are absolute t-statistics and the figures in curly brackets {} p-values. *** denotes significance at the 1% level and ** 
at the 5% level. The t-statistics in column (ii) are derived from heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSE). 
b.The significance levels of Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda’s scaled residuals are 0.97% and 1.63%, respectively, which fall below the one-tail 2.5% critical 
value of the outlier detection test. Thus, because the null of outliers (against the alternative of no outliers) cannot be rejected at the 2.5% 
significance level, two country dummies are automatically added to the regression model. 
c.Two heteroscedasticity tests are reported: one that uses squares (S) and the other squares and cross-products (X). The null hypotheses of the 
diagnostic tests are the following: i) no functional form misspecification (using squares and cubes), ii) homoscedasticity, iii) the residuals are 
normally distributed, and iv) structural stability based on Chow tests.  For more details, see Doornik and Hendry (2013).  
Source: Nell and Thirlwall (2017). 
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Discussion of Results 
Investment 
 Our finding of constant returns to capital means that changes in the investment ratio will 
have permanent growth effects on per capita income. This contrasts with the neoclassical 
interpretation of cross-country growth regressions (see Barro, 1991; Mankiw et. al., 1992) where a 
negative sign on the initial per capita variable is interpreted as diminishing returns to capital, so that 
permanent increases in the investment ratio only generate temporary growth effects. As we have 
already argued above, since the equation for the net productivity of investment (equation 11) 
provides a direct and unambiguous test of the returns to capital, the negative sign on the initial PCY 
in conventional new growth theory estimating equations can no longer be interpreted as evidence of 
diminishing returns to capital. Recent panel data evidence in Bond et. al. (2010) supports the cross-
country evidence presented here. They take a panel of 75 countries over the period 1960 to 2000 
using annual pooled data with country-specific effects, and filtering out business cycle fluctuations. 
They report that ‘ a permanent increase in investment as a share of GDP from 9.1 percent (the first 
quartile of our sample distribution) to 15.1 percent (the sample median) is predicted to increase the 
annual growth of GDP per worker by about 2 percentage points’ (p.1087). This implies a productivity 
of investment of 33 percent which is high. For individual countries, however, the mean estimate of 
the country coefficients shows a lower effect on growth with a productivity of investment of 16 
percent which is close to our estimate of 13 percent in Table 3. 
Education 
 With regard to education, the results in Table 3 show that the initial stock of education 
(TOTED80), as measured by the average years of primary, secondary and tertiary education, has a 
strong positive effect on the productivity of investment. The role of human capital stressed by new 
growth theory is supported. A one year increase in education increases the productivity of 
investment by 0.82 percentage points. The interaction term of the initial level of education with the 
initial level of per capita income, which measures whether the ability of countries to absorb new 
technology (i.e. to catch-up) is related to education suggests that it is. The significant negative sign 
on [(TOTED80)x(lnRGDP80)] of -0.0843 means that the negative coefficient on the initial PCY variable 
increases from -0.1539 to -0.2382. In other words, an extra year of schooling enables a country with 
a backlog of technology to catch up at a faster rate. 
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Trade 
 The results in Table 3 show that the two trade variables – the degree of openness (TOPEN) 
and the growth of exports (GEX) – are both statistically significant, but the impact of the growth of 
exports is greater. A ten percentage point increase in the growth of exports is associated with a 1.2 
percentage point increase in the productivity of investment, whereas a ten percentage point 
increase in the level of openness only improves investment productivity by 0.05 percentage points. 
 The impact of export growth on the productivity of investment works from both the supply-
side and the demand-side. Export growth allows a faster growth of imports which can improve the 
productivity of domestic investment. Export growth also has a direct effect on demand growth in an 
economy which helps keep capital fully employed. Even more important, export growth can lift a 
balance of payments constraint on domestic growth allowing all other components of demand to 
expand faster without causing shortages of foreign exchange (see Thirlwall, 2011 for an overview of 
the literature). The ability to maintain an economy at full employment, with demand growth 
matching potential supply growth, is vital for keeping the productivity of investment high. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
 The two main macroeconomic variables found to be significant are the standard deviation of 
inflation (INFLSDEV) and the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP (GCON), and they 
both impact negatively on the productivity of investment – although the impact is not large. A 10 
percentage point increase in the standard deviation of inflation reduces the productivity of 
investment by only 0.004 percentage points. The main channel through which macro-instability can 
reduce the productivity of investment is through the difficulty that an unstable economy has in 
maintaining a full employment level of output. Stop and start policies of governments confronted 
with inflation, and other sources of instability, are not conducive to the full utilisation of capital 
capacity. 
 The channels through which a higher level of government consumption may reduce the 
productivity of investment are numerous, but the main effect is likely to be a diversion of resources 
away from the higher productivity of the private sector, and the debt implications of government 
borrowing to finance consumption. The result does not imply, of course, that fiscal policy is 
ineffective, and, in any case, the impact is weak. A 10 percentage point increase in GCON/INV 
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reduces the productivity of investment by only 0.682 percentage points.10 We have not considered 
the impact of government investment on the overall productivity of investment. 
 
Geography and Institutions 
 The results in Table 3 show both geography and institutions matter for the productivity of 
investment. The positive impact on the productivity of investment of the absolute difference of a 
country from the equator (ABLAT) may have to do with the fact that tropical zones specialise more in 
agriculture than industry; that agricultural productivity itself is lower in the tropics than in the 
temperate zones, and temperate zones are less debilitating for workers than the heat of the tropics. 
The coefficient estimate of 0.0287 indicates that for a country ten degrees north or south of the 
equator, the net productivity of investment is nearly 0.3 percentage points higher. 
 With regard to political rights (PRIGHTS), the results in Table 3 indicate that a difference 
between 1 and 7 in the political rights index (with 1 high and 7 low) is associated with a difference in 
the productivity of investment of 1.16 percentage points. Democracy would appear to be good for 
growth.11 
Conclusion   
 The growth of an economy is equal by definition to how much it saves and invests as a 
proportion of national income, and the productivity of investment. Taking a cross-section of 84 rich 
and poor, developed and developing, countries over the period 1980-2011, we have shown that 
while investment is important for growth, differences in the productivity of investment are even 
more important in accounting for growth rate differences. To explore the causes of differences in 
the productivity of investment across countries, we convert a new growth theory estimating 
equation into an investment productivity equation, and consider nineteen different variables that 
might explain productivity differences. Using the productivity of investment as the dependent 
variable also allows us to test the neoclassical growth hypothesis of diminishing returns to capital. 
The evidence across the 84 countries, using descriptive and econometric analysis, shows that the  
                                                          
10 In Nell and Thirlwall (2017) it is argued that the small magnitude of the coefficient is due to the growth-
promoting effect of some components of government consumption spending and the growth-reducing effect 
of others. 
11 The political rights index is measured until the early 1990s and per capita income growth is averaged over 
the period 1980-2011. Thus, to a large extent, the results are capturing the growth effect after an initial shock 
to the political rights index. In addition, since geography appears to have played an important role in 
determining the quality of institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004), the significance of the 
physical geography variable (absolute latitude) in Table 3 may also  control for any endogeneity bias.  
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productivity of investment is as high in rich countries as it is in poor countries, although there are 
wide differences within groups of countries. The evidence supports the assumption of constant 
returns to capital, so that investment matters for long-run growth, contrary to the prediction of 
orthodox neoclassical theory. The empirical evidence is consistent with the AK model of new growth 
theory.   To explain the differences in the productivity of investment across countries we use a 
general-to-specific econometric model embedded in the software Autometrics which picks out the 
significant variables from all those that might be considered important. Of the nineteen variables 
considered, the most important seem to be related to macroeconomic-stability; education; export 
growth; geography and institutions. While these variables may not surprise, they do have important 
policy implications for countries which want to improve their growth performance. Indeed, these 
conclusions more or less mirror those of the World Bank’s Commission on Growth and 
Development, headed by Michael Spence, which identified six major factors characterising the 
fastest growing economies in the world economy since 1950, namely: high saving and investment 
rates; fast export growth; macroeconomic stability; effective governance; import of knowledge and 
technology, and market-friendly policies (World Bank, 2008). 
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Appendix 1: List of Variables 
 
Note: World Bank Development Indicators, 2012 (WBDI 
 
 
 
    
         Dependent Variables: 
1)      g Growth rate of real GDP 
at domestic prices. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
2) (g – p) Growth rate of real GDP 
per capita. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
3) nPOI Net productivity of 
investment: (g – p)/(I/Y) 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
Independent Variables (regressors): 
4) ABLAT (+)    Absolute latitude from the 
equator. 
Measures the impact of 
geography on economic 
development. See 
Gallup et al. (1999).  
See Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) for source. 
5) FDEV90 (+)  Ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP. The ratio is a 
measure of financial 
development, as discussed 
in Levine (1997). 
Following King and 
Levine (1993), we use 
an initial value. For 
most countries a value 
in 1990 is available. For 
those countries without 
a 1990 value, we chose 
the closest possible year 
in the interval 1991-
1994.    
The latest version 
of the dataset 
(November 2013) 
described in Beck 
et al. (2000). 
6) GCON (-)  Ratio of general 
government consumption 
expenditure to GDP. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
7) GEX (+)  Growth rate of real 
exports of goods and 
services. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
8) GPO (p), (-) or (+) Growth rate of 
population. 
Average: 1980-2011. 
Scale effects (+) or 
resource depletion (-). 
WBDI. 
9) INFL (-) or (+) Inflation rate derived 
from the GDP deflator. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
10) INFLSDEV (-)  Standard deviation of the 
inflation rate derived from 
the GDP deflator.  
1980-2011.  WBDI. 
11) INV (I/Y), (+) Investment ratio = the 
ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation (I) to GDP (Y). 
Both I and Y are nominal 
domestic price values. 
Average: 1980-2011. WBDI. 
12) lnPOP80 (+) Natural logarithm (ln) of 
the population size in 
1980.  
Measures scale effects 
associated with market 
size. See Alesina et al. 
(2000).  
WBDI. 
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Appendix 1: List of Variables (Continued) 
 
Note:  World Bank Development Indicators, 2012 (WBDI, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables: 
Variable (Expected Sign) Description Comments Source 
13) lnRGDP80 (-) Natural logarithm (ln) of 
the initial level of 
purchasing-power-parity 
adjusted real GDP per 
capita income in 1980 
(constant 2005 dollars). 
The initial level for 
most of the countries 
is 1980. For the small 
number of countries 
without a 1980 value, 
the closest possible 
year. 
WBDI. 
14) MINING (+)   The share of mining and 
quarrying in GDP. 
Data are for the year 
1988 or the closest 
possible year. 
Hall and Jones 
(1999).  
15) OPEN (+) Measures the proportion of 
years in the interval 1965-
1990 in which an economy 
is open to international 
trade. 
The binary index takes 
a value of 1 or 0, 
where 1 indicates open 
and 0 closed. 
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1995). 
16) REVCOUP (-) 
 
Revolutions and Coups. Number of military 
coups and revolutions 
Barro (1991). 
17) PRIGHTS (-) A political rights index that 
measures democracy 
compiled by Gastil and his 
associates (1982-1983 and 
subsequent issues) from 
1972 to 1994. 
The index ranges from 
1 to 7, with 1 
indicating the group of 
countries with the 
highest level of 
political rights and 7 
the lowest. 
Barro (1998). 
18) SECTER80 (+) Average years of secondary 
and tertiary education of 
total population. 
Initial value in 1980. Barro and Lee 
(2013). 
19) [SECTER80lnRGDP80]   (-)   Interactive (product) term, 
with variables defined 
above. 
Initial values in 1980. Barro and Lee 
(2013); 
WBDI. 
20) TOTED80 (+) Total education: average 
years of primary, secondary 
and tertiary education of 
total population.  
Initial value in 1980. Barro and Lee 
(2013). 
21) [TOTED80lnRGDP80]   (-)   Interactive (product) term, 
with variables defined 
above. 
Initial values in 1980. Barro and Lee 
(2013); 
WBDI. 
22) TOPEN (+) The ratio of total trade 
(imports + exports) to GDP. 
Measures trade openness. 
Average: 1980-2011 WBDI. 
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APPENDIX 2: List of Countries 
 Number Country 
Income Classification 
(World Bank, 2013) 
1 Argentina Upper middle income 
2 Australia High income 
3 Austria High income 
4 Bangladesh Low income 
5 Belgium High income 
6 Benin Low income 
7 Bolivia Lower middle income 
8 Botswana Upper middle income 
9 Brazil Upper middle income 
10 Cameroon Lower middle income 
11 Canada High income 
12 Chile High income 
13 Colombia Upper middle income 
14 Congo, Democratic Republic Low income 
15 Congo, Republic Lower middle income 
16 Costa Rica Upper middle income 
17 Cote d'Ivoire Lower middle income 
18 Cyprus High income 
19 Denmark High income 
20 Dominican Republic Upper middle income 
21 Ecuador Upper middle income 
22 Egypt Lower middle income 
23 El Salvador Lower middle income 
24 Finland High income 
25 France High income 
26 Gambia Low income 
27 Germany High income 
28 Ghana Lower middle income 
29 Greece High income 
30 Guatemala Lower middle income 
31 Honduras Lower middle income 
32 Hong Kong High income 
33 Iceland High income 
34 India Lower middle income 
35 Indonesia Lower middle income 
36 Israel High income 
37 Italy High income 
38 Japan High income 
39 Jordan Upper middle income 
40 Kenya Low income 
41 Korea High income 
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42 Luxembourg High income 
43 Malawi Low income 
44 Malaysia Upper middle income 
45 Mali Low income 
46 Malta High income 
47 Mauritania Lower middle income 
48 Mauritius Upper middle income 
49 Mexico Upper middle income 
50 Morocco Lower middle income 
51 Mozambique Low income 
52 Netherlands High income 
53 New Zealand High income 
54 Nicaragua Lower middle income 
55 Norway High income 
56 Pakistan Lower middle income 
57 Panama Upper middle income 
58 Paraguay Lower middle income 
59 Peru Upper middle income 
60 Philippines Lower middle income 
61 Portugal High income 
62 Rwanda Low income 
63 Senegal Lower middle income 
64 Sierra Leone Low income 
65 Singapore High income 
66 South Africa Upper middle income 
67 Spain High income 
68 Sri Lanka Lower middle income 
69 Sudan Lower middle income 
70 Swaziland Lower middle income 
71 Sweden High income 
72 Switzerland High income 
73 Syria Lower middle income 
74 Tanzania Low income 
75 Thailand Upper middle income 
76 Togo Low income 
77 Trinidad & Tobago High income 
78 Tunisia Upper middle income 
79 Turkey Upper middle income 
80 Uganda Low income 
81 United Kingdom High income 
82 United States High income 
83 Uruguay High income 
84 Zambia Lower middle income 
 
